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ABSTRACT
We present a simple model of the effects of hate crime legislation. It shows that even if the direct
harm to victims of hate crime is the same as for other crimes, because of other differences in the
effects it may still be optimal to exert more law-enforcement effort to deter or prevent hate crime.
These differences also have previously unrecognized effects on the optimal level of effort by
potential hate crime victims to avoid being victimized, thus affecting the efficiency of government
policies that encourage or discourage such effort. We discuss the implications of these results for



















Reported “hate crimes” have increased dramatically in the United States in recent
years; the number of reported incidents rose from 4,588 in 1991 to 9,730 in 2001.
1  This
rise, along with the attention paid by popular media to high profile cases, such as the
murders of James Byrd in Texas and Matthew Shepard in Wyoming, has produced
unprecedented public interest in the issue and potential remedies.  As of 1999, 41 states
had passed “hate crime” or “bias crime” laws: laws that create or enhance penalties for
crimes motivated at least in part by the victim’s race, religion, or other protected category
(see Grattet and Jenness, 2001).
2  In essence, these laws mandate stronger punishment
based on the motivation behind the crime.  Debate over these laws centers on the question
of whether this additional punishment is justified.
3
Hate crime has attracted substantial attention in the fields of law, sociology,
psychology, and other social sciences, but very little within the field of economics.
Jefferson and Pryor (1999), Medoff (1999), and Gale, Heath, and Ressler (2002) provide
empirical analyses of hate crime data.  The latter two papers also briefly present theories
to explain hate crimes.  Glaeser (2002) provides a much more extensive and thorough
economic theory of hatred.  None of these papers, however, address the normative issue
of optimal hate crime policy.
In this paper, we present a formal model of law enforcement in the presence of
hate crimes, and use that model to investigate the conditions under which it is optimal to
impose harsher penalties for hate crimes–or, more generally, to exert greater public effort
                                                
1 See Federal Bureau of Investigation (1991 and 2001).  Of course, the rise could be due to increased
reporting rather than higher rates of such crime, but in either case, it indicates increased attention to the
problem.
2 The set of protected categories varies across different states’ laws; as of 1999, nearly all included race,
religion, and national origin, while gender, sexual orientation, and disability were protected in roughly half
of the states with hate crime laws.  A handful of states also include such categories as political affiliation,
age, marital status, involvement in civil rights, or service in the armed forces.
3 Jacobs and Potter (1998, p. 147) articulate the argument against hate crime laws: “We do not believe that
crimes motivated by hate invariably are morally worse or lead to more severe consequences for the victims
than the same criminal act prompted by other motivations.”2
to prevent hate crimes–than for otherwise similar crimes not motivated by hatred.  We
also examine the implications of these conditions for other aspects of hate crime policy:
for example, should government policy encourage effort by members of targeted groups to
make themselves less likely to be victims of hate crime?
Our model is similar in nature to Becker’s (1968) economic model of crime.
4  In
this model, potential criminals derive some benefit from committing a crime, but weigh
that against their expected cost–both in terms of effort and expected punishment–when
deciding whether or not to commit a crime.  Law enforcement and efforts by potential
targets to protect themselves from crime can increase the expected cost to potential
criminals, and thus reduce crime rates.
While there is widespread agreement on the defining characteristic that
distinguishes hate crime from other crime–the motivation for the crime–there is much less
agreement on the effects of hate crime and on exactly why such crimes should be
punished more harshly.  To accommodate this diversity of opinion, we consider five
possible ways in which hate crimes may differ from other crimes and thus warrant greater
punishment, drawing on hate crimes research from other social sciences and on Glaeser’s
(2002) economic theory of hatred,.  First, society may put a lower weight on the utility
of hate criminals than on the utility of other criminals.  For example, the utility that a
mugger gets from stolen money would count in calculating social welfare, but the pleasure
that the perpetrator of a hate crime gets from inflicting suffering is invalid and should not
be counted.
5  Second, hate crime may harm other people in addition to the direct victim.
In particular, other members of the targeted group may suffer disutility from sympathy
for the victim or fear that they themselves will be attacked.
Third, efforts by potential targets to avoid being victims of hate crime may
generate a negative externality.  For example, they might try to hide their identities, thus
                                                
4 Freeman (1999) provides a survey of the extensive literature related to the Becker model.
5 The phenomenon of “hating the haters” noted by Glaeser (2002) would also lead to a lower (or even
negative) weight on the utility of hate criminals.3
resulting a loss of diversity to society.  Fourth, hate crime might be more difficult for
victims to avoid.  A person can reduce his chance of being mugged by avoiding visible
displays of wealth, but cannot change his skin color to avoid race-based hate crime.  Fifth,
there may be fewer potential targets of hate crime than for other crimes, leading to a
higher probability that any particular potential target will in fact be a victim.  While the
primary focus of this paper is on hate crimes, it is worth noting that the first four of these
differences also apply to acts of terrorism, and thus many of our conclusions will also
apply to anti-terrorism policy as well.
 We show that each of these differences may justify greater public effort to
prevent hate crimes than to prevent other crimes, even if the direct harm to the victim is
the same.  However, in most of these cases, greater public effort is optimal only under
particular conditions, most notably on the complementarity or substitutability between
public and private effort–a point that prior hate crime research has not noted.
6  We also
show that these differences between hate crime and other crimes affect the socially
optimal level of private effort relative to the individually optimal level.  Thus, if the
government can encourage or discourage private effort through means other than just the
overall level of public effort–for example, if it is possible to subsidize private effort or to
choose types of public effort that are more complementary to private effort–then it will
be optimal for hate crime policy to differ from policy toward other crimes on those
dimensions as well as on the overall level of public effort.
In the next section, we present a simple model that incorporates these differences
and demonstrates their implications for the optimal design of hate crime legislation.  The
final section contains conclusions and a discussion of additional factors that fall outside
the scope of the model.
                                                
6 Many studies in law and economics have shown that the optimal level of government effort to prevent
crime depends strongly on the degree of complementarity or substitutability between government and
private effort (see, e.g., Ben-Shahar and Harel, 1995).  Some of our results are similar to the results of
those studies in that they stem from distortions in potential victims’ decisions about how much effort to
exert to avoid being victimized.  However, the sources of those distortions in this paper are quite different
from those in prior work.4
II. The Model
In this section, we first provide a baseline model of crime and law enforcement
that applies to any crime, and then extend that model to capture the ways in which hate
crime may differ from other crimes.
A. The Baseline Model
Three types of agents interact with each other:  potential criminals, potential
victims, and the government.  There is a continuum of mass N
C of potential criminals.
Each criminal i chooses to commit one crime if the benefit Bi from doing so exceeds the
expected cost C
C.  The benefit from crime for each criminal is drawn independently from a
uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1].  The cost of committing a crime is given by the
average protection level (defined below) across potential victims, P , and is the same for
all potential criminals.
7 The mass of crimes committed, then, is N
C [1 – P ].
The group of potential victims constitutes a continuum of mass N
V > N
C.  All
potential victims are assumed to be identical.  If a crime is committed against a particular
potential victim, that victim suffers a utility loss of 
€ 
ΔU ∈ 0,1 ( ).  The protection level for
potential victim i,   P(ai, g), is a function both of individual effort to avoid crime (ai) and
of the level of government effort to catch and punish criminals (g).  The function P is
assumed to be bounded between 0 and 1, and to be increasing and strictly concave in each
of its arguments:  P1 > 0, P2 > 0, P11 < 0, and P22 < 0.  That is, exerting more effort of
either type raises the level of protection, but the marginal effect falls as the level of effort
rises.  For now, we make no assumptions on the degree of complementarity or
substitutability between individual and government effort (that is, on the sign and
magnitude of the cross-partial derivative P12).  As shown later in this paper, this
parameter has important implications for hate crime policy.  For simplicity, we assume
that all third- and higher-order derivatives of P are zero.
                                                
7 For simplicity, we assume that there is no uncertainty in the cost of committing a crime.  This should
not affect the results, because this certain cost could represent the certainty equivalent of an uncertain cost.5
We assume that the cost of individual effort C
V(ai) increases quadratically.  That
is, 
V C1 > 0, 
V C11> 0, and all higher order derivatives are zero.  The probability that
individual i is victimized depends on his protection level P(ai, g) and on the ratio of the
mass of potential criminals to the mass of potential victims N
C / N
V.  In particular, we




g a P N )] , ( 1 [ − . The total number of crimes
committed, then, is given by  [ ] P N
C − 1 , as specified before.
Given government effort g, each potential victim maximizes expected utility by
solving the problem









We assume that  ) 0 ( 1
V C  is sufficiently small to ensure an interior solution to Expression
(1).  The necessary and sufficient condition for this unique solution a* is given by








Each individual chooses the same level of effort a(g), which varies with
government effort g, so the average protection level  is equal to P(a(g), g)..  Implicit















Because the denominator of Expression (3) is positive, the sign of a1(g) is the same as the
sign of the cross-partial derivative P12.  If individual and government efforts are
complementary (P12 > 0), then the optimal level of individual effort increases with the
level of government effort.  If, on the other hand, government effort acts as a substitute
for individual effort (P12 < 0), then individuals exert less effort as government effort rises.
The total effect of a marginal increase in government effort (g) on the average
protection level  is  ) ), ( ( ) ( ) ), ( ( 1 1 2 g g a P g a g g a P + .  Note that if individual and
government effort are strong enough substitutes (that is, if a1(g) is negative enough), then6
increasing g may actually lower the average protection level and result in more crime.
However, we rule out that case as unrealistic.
The third and last type of agent is the government.  The government faces a cost
of effort in catching and punishing criminals (which we sometimes refer to just as
punishment effort) given by the increasing and convex function C
G(g).  (We assume that
the government’s cost depends neither on the mass of crimes committed nor on the size
of the group of potential victims.  In Section III, we discuss the effects of relaxing that
restriction.)  The government chooses its effort level to maximize expected societal utility,
which is the sum of potential victims’ and criminals’ utility, less the cost of government
effort.

































In selecting its effort level g, the government must weigh the benefits of increasing g
against the costs.  A higher government effort level g affects the welfare of the potential
victims in two ways.  First, there is the direct effect of a lower crime rate resulting from
the increased cost of committing a crime P(a(g), g).  Second, increasing g changes the
equilibrium level of avoidance effort by the victims a(g), and thus leads to a different cost
of effort C
V(a(g)).  That second effect may be either a cost (if a and g are complements)
or a benefit (if they are substitutes).  On the other hand, the social cost of raising
government effort g includes both the direct cost to the government C
G(g) and the cost to
potential criminals due to the higher cost of committing crimes.  The first order condition
for an interior solution to the government’s problem is given by
€ 
N
C ⋅ΔU P 1(a(g),g)a1(g)+ P2(a(g),g) [ ]− N
Va1(g)C1
V(a(g))




                                                
8 Glaeser and Sacerdote (2003) find that patterns of homicide sentencing are inconsistent with the
predictions of this type of optimal law-enforcement model, and posit that this is caused by a taste for
vengeance.  Our analysis is primarily normative, and thus we ignore such issues, but they could be
important in a positive analysis.7
Substituting in the first-order condition for potential victims (Expression (2)) and
suppressing the arguments for the sake of clarity yields Condition (5a):
€ 
N
CP2{ΔU −1+ P}+ N
Ca1P{−1+ P}−C1
G = 0. (5a)
We assume that the cost function C
G(g) is sufficiently convex that the government’s
objective function (in Expression (4)) is concave.  In that case, Condition 5a is both
necessary and sufficient for an interior solution to the government’s optimization.
Finally, it is useful to consider the socially optimal level of avoidance effort by
potential victims, because it will help in interpreting later results.  Furthermore, while in
this model the government can affect the level of avoidance effort only by changing the
level of punishment effort, in a richer model, the government might have more influence.
For example, the government might be able to tax or subsidize some types of avoidance
activities, or might choose among different methods of law enforcement that vary in their
degree of complementarity or substitutability with avoidance effort by potential victims.
The socially optimal level of private effort a
** is the level that maximizes social utility




**,g ( ) ΔU −1+ P a
**,g ( ) { }− N
VC1
V a
** ( ) = 0, (6)
The notation a
**  is used to distinguish the socially optimal level from the level that is
optimal from the perspective of a potential victim,. a
* . Note that a
** < a
* : that is, the
level of avoidance effort chosen by potential victims exceeds the socially optimal level.
This occurs because potential victims do not take into account the utility of potential
criminals, who are made worse off by greater avoidance effort.
9
Absent any cost of effort by the government and potential victims, the optimal




 to the victims of the additional
                                                
9 Note that this effect could be reversed if there is a positive externality from avoidance effort–if, for
example, avoidance effort by one potential victim also benefits other potential victims.  Ayres and Levitt
(1998) note that the Lojack system to prevent car theft has just such a positive externality.  This system
sends a radio signal to help police track a stolen car.  Since the radio transmitter on the car is difficult for
prospective thieves to discover, the presence of Lojack on some cars reduces car thefts even for cars without
the system.  In contrast, a highly visible alarm system might encourage a potential thief to steal a different
car, thus creating a negative externality.  For simplicity, we rule out such externalities from avoidance
effort in this baseline model.8
crime resulting from lowering the expected cost P to the benefit (1 × N
C [1 – P]) that the
mass of criminals committing crimes get from the lower cost.  That is, the optimal
expected cost P would satisfy 
€ 
ΔU −1+ P = 0.  Because the value of 
€ 
ΔU lies between 0
and 1, that optimal P is also between 0 and 1.  When government and victim costs are
included, we make two assumptions on the optimal level of government effort g
*.  First,
we assume that g
* is strictly positive, so that the unique solution is characterized by
Condition (5a).  That is, there is scope for government action after the private effort by
the potential victims is undertaken.  Second, we assume that g
* is such that
€ 
ΔU −1+ P a g
* ( ),g
* ( ) > 0.  That is, the equilibrium level of crime at the optimum level of
government effort is higher if effort is costly than if effort is costless.  By making those
two assumptions, we restrict attention to what we consider the interesting, realistic case.
B. Hate Crimes
We consider five possible ways in which hate crime might differ from other crime
in the context of our model, each of which could imply a higher optimal level of
government effort to prevent hate crime than to prevent other crimes.  In each case, we
hold the rest of the model fixed.
The first is that the utility of those who commit hate crimes might get a lower
weight in the government’s objective function than the utility of those who commit other
crimes.  One argument that would support this approach is that some sources of utility
should not count toward social welfare.  As stated by a survey respondent cited in
Iganski (2001, p. 632), “it is somehow more odious to harm someone for no other reason
than because of who they are, not because they have something that you want.”  Thus,
while the utility that a mugger gets from the money that he steals would count, the utility
that the perpetrator of a hate crime gets from inflicting suffering would not count.
Glaeser’s (2002) theory of hatred provides an alternative argument.  He notes that
one effective strategy for fighting hatred is to publicize images of violent hate-motivated
attacks on minorities, which leads people to “hate the haters.”  In this case, those who9
hate the haters would derive utility from making potential hate criminals worse off, which
would reduce the weight on the potential criminals’ utility (or even lead to a negative
weight, for a sufficiently large number of people with a sufficiently strong level of hate
against the haters).  Under either argument, the relative weight on criminals utility would






C P B N )





and represents the relative weight on criminals’ utility.
Second, hate crime might generate a negative externality.  This could occur in
several ways.  Members of the targeted group other than the direct victim may also suffer
disutility from the crime, because they feel threatened or feel sympathy for the victim.  A
report by the U.S. Department of Justice (1997, p. x) says that “A hate crime victimizes
not only the immediate target but every member of the group that the immediate target
represents.”  Other members of society may feel ashamed that such crimes took place.
Hate crimes may incite retaliatory attacks by members of the targeted group, making the
victims of those attacks worse off.  The Department of Justice report goes on to note that
“Apart from their psychological impacts, violent hate crimes can create tides of retaliation
and counterretaliation.” Recall that the number of crimes is  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) g g a P N
C , 1− . We model
the negative externality by adding the  term  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) g g a P N f
C , 1−  to the government’s
objective function in Expression (4), where f(_) is a negative and decreasing function.
10
Third, avoidance effort by potential victims may generate a negative externality.
One way to avoid being a victim of hate crime is to hide your identity: Jews may try to
pass as non-Jews, or gays may remain closeted, for example.  If society values diversity,
efforts like this to hide one’s identity will create a negative externality.
11   These efforts
                                                
10 On the other hand, widespread hatred of the targeted group would imply a positive externality from hate
crime, because other people who share the perpetrator’s hatred will also derive utility from the harm he
inflicts on the victim.  This could lead to a lower optimal penalty or even a reward for crimes against a
sufficiently hated minority–a very troubling conclusion.
11 However, this could also create a positive externality if visible minorities generate disutility–again, a
troubling conclusion.  For example, those who are homophobic may prefer to have gays be forced to stay10
may also increase hatred.  In Glaeser’s (2002) model, contact with members of a minority
group makes it more costly to hate that group, and thus reduces the level of hatred.  But
that effect could be reduced or eliminated if minority individuals hide their identities or
avoid contact with those who hate them.
12  And hate crimes often target those who are
fighting for minority rights (e.g., civil rights workers and politically active blacks in the
American South during the 1960’s).  We model these cases by adding the term e(a(g)) to
the government’s objective function in Expression (4), where e(_) is a negative and
decreasing function that represents this negative externality.
Fourth, it may be more difficult to avoid being the victim of a hate crime than to
avoid being the victim of other crimes.  McDevitt et al. (2001, p. 706) says that unlike
victims of other crimes, “…bias crime victims expressed feelings of frustration when
asked how to prevent or reduce such crimes in the future.  They generally did not indicate
that their actions had done anything to provoke or exacerbate a situation.” It is relatively
easy to avoid visible displays of wealth and thus reduce one’s chances of being mugged,
but it is impossible to change one’s skin color to avoid race-based hate crime, for example.
We model this as a uniform increase in the marginal cost of avoidance effort by potential
victims, 
V C1 , to 
V C1 + ε. The second derivative, 
V C11, is unchanged.
Fifth, since hate crimes typically target minorities, the number of potential victims
may be smaller for a hate crime than for other crimes, thus raising the probability that any
particular individual in that group will be a crime victim. We model this by having a
smaller mass of potential victims N
V.
Note that we do not explicitly consider the case in which the direct harm to the
victim (
€ 
ΔU) differs between hate crimes and other crimes. The implications of that case
are obvious: if hate crime does more harm to the victim than other crime, then, all else the
                                                                                                                                                
in the closet.  This, along with the argument in the previous footnote, may explain why support is much
weaker for hate crime laws that include sexual orientation among the protected categories than for those that
do not (see Johnson and Byers, 2003).
12 McDevitt et al. (2002) find that roughly 25% of hate crimes reported in Boston targeted minority
households that had recently moved into a previously all-White block, with the apparent goal of
convincing the outsider to move to a different neighborhood.11
same, this will imply a higher optimal punishment.
III. Results
Here we analyze the optimal government effort to catch and punish criminals (g)
for each of the five potential differences between hate crime and other crimes, as described
in the previous section.  We show that in either of the first two cases (discounting
criminals’ utility, negative externality from crime), the optimal punishment effort is higher
for a hate crime than for other crime, all else equal.  For the other three cases, the effect
depends on the degree of complementarity or substitutability between victim and
government effort.  In the third or fifth case (negative externality from avoidance effort,
smaller mass of potential victims), optimal government effort is higher for a hate crime if
individual and government effort are substitutes, but lower if they are complements.  In
the fourth case (higher marginal cost of avoidance effort), optimal government effort is
higher for hate crime if individual and government effort are sufficiently strong
substitutes.  If they are complements or are sufficiently weak substitutes, the optimal
government effort will be lower for hate crime than for other crime.






H5, respectively, denote the optimal levels for the five ways in
which hate crime may differ from other crimes, taken one at a time.  Our first result
pertains to the first case, in which there is a lower weight in the government’s objective
function on the utility of potential hate criminals.  One of the social costs of higher
government effort is that it lowers the utility of potential criminals.  If their utility gets a
lower weight, that effectively lowers the social cost of government effort, and thus
increases the optimal level of government effort.
Result 1.  All else equal, if the utility of potential hate criminals gets a lower weight in
the government’s objective function than the utility of other potential criminals, the
optimal punishment effort is higher for hate crime than for other crimes.12
Proof:  In the baseline model, Condition (5a) is satisfied at g
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1
) ), ( (
g g a P B N
g g a P
C , in the government’s objective function in Expression (4)
by multiplying it by 
€ 
δ means that the term  [ ] } 1 { 2 1 1 P P a P N
C + − +  will be multiplied by 
€ 
δ
in the derivative in Condition (5).  That term is strictly negative, as long as public and
private effort are not such strong substitutes that higher public effort reduces private
effort by enough to increase the crime rate, which seems unrealistic.  Thus, multiplying
that term by 
€ 
δ (which is less than 1) drives the value of the expression above zero.
Because the objective function is concave, then, g
H1 must exceed g
* to restore optimality.
■
For the case in which there is a negative externality from hate crime, the benefit of
reducing crime is greater, because less crime implies both less harm to victims and less
harm from the externality.  Thus, the optimal level of government effort is higher.
Result 2.  All else equal, if there is a negative externality from hate crime, the optimal
level of punishment effort is higher for hate crime than for other crimes.
Proof:  Adding a negative externality f( N
C [1 – P(a(g), g)] ) to the government’s objective
function in Expression (4) means adding the term  [ ] ( ) ( ) 2 1 1 1 1 P a P P N f
C + − −  to the
derivative on the left-hand-side of Condition (5a).  That term is positive (again, as long as
an increase in g leads to a decrease in crime).  So, as in the previous proof, g
H2 must be
greater than g
* for the government’s first-order condition to be satisfied. ■
Note that in both of these first two cases, the effect is different from that of
simply increasing the harm to victims (
€ 
ΔU).  In the baseline model, potential victims
choose a level of avoidance effort (a
*) that exceeds the socially optimal level (a
**), because
they do not take into account the effect on potential criminals’ utility.  The individually
optimal level of effort would continue to exceed the socially optimal level if the harm to13
victims were increased, because the harm to victims appears in both the government
objective function and the objective function for a potential victim.  But lowering the
weight on potential criminals’ utility or introducing a negative externality from crime
could change this result, because these terms do not appear in potential victims’ objective
functions; if these effects are sufficiently large, they would result in a socially optimal
level of avoidance effort equal to or greater than the level that potential victims choose.  In
essence, the effect on potential criminals is a negative externality from potential victims’
effort.  Reducing the weight on potential criminals’ utility reduces the magnitude of this
externality, while introducing a negative externality from crime means that there is
effectively a positive externality from avoidance effort, because it reduces crime; in either
case, the socially optimal level of avoidance effort increases.
This has two implications for government policy toward hate crime.  First, it
affects the optimal level of punishment effort.  In either of these first two cases, if public
and private effort are substitutes then the increase in the optimal level of punishment
effort will be smaller than it would be for an equivalent increase in the harm to victims:
there is less incentive for the government to discourage private effort by increasing public
effort.  Conversely, if public and private effort are complements, then the optimal level of
punishment effort will increase by more in either of these first two cases than for an
equivalent increase in the harm to victims.  In these cases, it is optimal for the government
to do more to encourage (or do less to discourage) avoidance effort, and one way to do
that is to adjust the level of punishment effort.  In the extreme case in which avoidance
and punishment effort are such strong substitutes that the equilibrium level of crime
actually rises when punishment effort increases, this can reverse the effect on optimal
punishment effort, which would fall.  In contrast, simply increasing the damage to victims
will always increase optimal punishment effort, regardless of the degree of
substitutability between punishment and avoidance.
Second, this implies that if the government has other means to affect avoidance
effort, the optimal policy for hate crimes would do more to encourage avoidance than14
would the optimal policy for other crimes.  Thus, the government might subsidize
avoidance effort for hate crimes, or might choose a method of enforcement and
punishment that is more complementary to avoidance effort.  These policies are beyond
the scope of our model, but might well be important in a real-world setting.  This is an
issue that has gone largely unnoticed in both the public and academic debates over hate
crime laws; the debate has focused primarily on enforcement and punishment effort, with
little or no discussion of ways to encourage individuals to do more to protect themselves
against hate crime.  But, at least in these first two cases, any time it is optimal to exert
more public effort to deter and punish hate crime, it is also optimal to encourage potential
victims to exert more private effort.
Next, consider the third possible difference between hate crime and other crimes:
there may be a negative externality from avoidance effort.  In this case, the effect on
optimal punishment effort is slightly more complicated.  Recall that if government and
individual effort are substitutes (P12 < 0), then the equilibrium level of individual effort
a(g) decreases with g.  In that case, the externality increases the marginal benefit of
government effort, since a higher g leads to lower victims’ effort.  On the other hand, if
P12 > 0, then a1(g) > 0, and the externality decreases the marginal benefit of government
effort.  Thus, a hate crime under in this case requires a higher level of punishment effort in
the case of substitutes, and a lower effort in the case of complements.  That result is
formalized below.
Result 3.  All else equal, if there is a negative externality from hate crime avoidance effort,
then the optimal punishment effort will be higher for hate crime than for other crime if
punishment effort and avoidance effort are substitutes, and will be lower if they are
complements.
Proof:  Adding a negative externality e(a(g)) to the government’s objective function in
Expression (4) means adding the term e1(a(g)) a1(g) to the derivative on the left-hand-side15
of Condition (5).  According to Expression (3), if P12 < 0, then so is a1(g), and the new
term is positive.  As before, then, g
H2 must be greater than g
* to restore equality.
Analogously, if P12 > 0, then the new term is negative, and g
H2 is less than g
*. ■
Note that this leads to the opposite effect on the socially optimal level of
avoidance effort from the first two cases: it is even further below the level that potential
victims choose than it is in the baseline model.  Thus, it is optimal for the government to
do more to discourage avoidance effort, either through changing the level of punishment
effort or through other means.  This suggests that some hate crimes warrant more
punishment effort than others; for example, if there is a negative externality from
segregation, it might be optimal to have a harsher penalty for a hate crime committed
against a black family living in an otherwise all-White neighborhood than for an otherwise
identical hate crime committed against a black family living in a black neighborhood, in
order to provide better incentives for integrating neighborhoods.
Now consider the fourth possible difference between hate crimes and other crimes:
hate crimes are associated with a higher marginal cost of avoidance effort by potential
victims.  In that case, each government effort level g is associated with a lower effort level
and a higher marginal cost of effort in equilibrium for a hate crime relative to a regular
crime.  Suppose that P12 > 0, so that victim and government effort are complementary,
implying that a(g) increases with g.  Then a hate crime has three effects, all of which act
to lower the optimal government effort.  First, the marginal cost of individual effort
(which is increasing in g) is higher.  Second, the total marginal effect of g on the protection
level P, P1 a1+ P2 falls.  Finally, a lower level of victim effort means a greater mass of
criminals committing crimes.  Thus, the societal cost of increasing P (the expected cost of
committing a crime) increases, because there are more criminals incurring that cost.  If P12
> 0, then, g
H4 < g
*.
When individual and government effort are substitutes (P12 < 0), two of the three
effects change sign.  Individual effort a(g) now is decreasing in g, so the higher marginal16
cost of individual effort makes government effort more attractive.  Similarly, the overall
marginal effect of g on P rises with the fall in a.  On the other hand, there is still a greater
mass of active criminals, which reduces the welfare gain from raising g.  If the degree of
substitutability is high enough, then the first two effects outweigh the third, and g
H4 > g
*.
Those two findings are shown in Result 4.
Result 4.  All else equal, if avoidance effort is more expensive for hate crimes than for
other crimes, the optimal level of punishment effort is lower for hate crimes than for other
crimes unless punishment and avoidance effort are sufficiently strong substitutes.
Proof: see Appendix
Effort to avoid crime and effort to catch and punish criminals might be strongly
complementary if, for example, avoidance effort took the form of increased alertness and
watchfulness for suspicious activity.  In that case, the higher probability of witnesses
would greatly increase the effectiveness both of police effort to catch criminals and of
prosecutorial effort to convict them.  On the other hand, if potential victims seek to avoid
crime by secluding themselves at home, increased avoidance effort might hinder
government effort to catch and punish criminals, and so there would be no
complementarity.
Finally, consider the fifth way in which hate crime may differ from other crimes:
the mass of potential victims N
V is smaller.  That change does not directly affect the
number of crimes committed, which depends only on the mass of criminals N
C and the
average protection level .  Instead, the change works indirectly through its effect on a1(g),
the response of individual effort to a change in government effort.  When N
V rises, that
derivative (and thus the total marginal effect of g on P) increases if individual and
government action are substitutes, and decreases if they are complements.  There is also a
second effect of a change in N
V:  the more victims that are incurring the cost of individual
effort, the more desirable it is to decrease the equilibrium level of such effort.  That is,17
increasing g becomes more attractive in the case of substitutes, and less attractive in the
case of complements.  Both effects imply a higher level of government action if it is a
substitute for effort by the victims, and a lower level if it is a complement, as Result 5
shows.
Result 5.  All else equal, if there are fewer potential hate crime victims than potential
victims of other crimes, the optimal punishment effort is higher for hate crimes than for
other crimes when punishment and avoidance effort are substitutes, and lower when they
are complements.
Proof: see Appendix
Note that we have assumed that the cost of government effort does not depend on
the volume of crimes committed 
€ 
N
C 1− P [ ], nor does it depend on the number of potential
victims N
V.  The consequence of relaxing that assumption and supposing instead that
government costs increase with the volume of crime is to raise the optimal level of
government effort g both in the baseline model and for each definition of hate crime.
There are no qualitative effects on any of our results, however.  If we allow the cost of
government effort to rise with the mass of the potential victims, there is a qualitative
change only for this last case, in which there is a smaller pool of potential hate crime
victims than of potential victims of other crimes.  In this case, having the cost of
government effort depend on the number of victims implies a lower cost of effort to
prevent hate crimes, and thus a higher optimal level of government effort.
IV. Conclusion
We have presented a simple model of the effects of hate crime legislation.  It
shows that even if the harm to the direct victim of hate crime is the same as the harm from
non-hate-motivated crime, other differences may lead to a higher optimal punishment for
hate crime.  However, the implications of these other differences are not as18
straightforward as prior hate-crime research has implied.  In several of the cases we
consider, the optimal level of public effort to prevent hate crime could be greater than or
less than the optimal effort for other crime, depending on the complementarity or
substitutability between public and private effort.  And even for the cases in which the
optimal punishment for hate crimes is unambiguously higher than for other crimes, we
find important and previously unrecognized implications for policy that encourages or
discourages private effort to prevent hate crime.
While this paper has focused on hate crime, the implications of this model extend
to any other crimes that have similar effects.  One notable example is terrorism, which
shares many of the characteristics of hate crime: society puts little weight (or even a
negative weight) on the welfare of terrorists, terrorism creates negative externalities (such
as fear and the possibility of discrimination against Arab Americans), and private effort to
avoid terrorism (for example, by avoiding air travel) is very difficult.  Thus, our results
should apply equally well to laws that require higher penalties for terrorism or for
policies that encourage or discourage private effort to prevent terrorism.
There are several important aspects of this problem that are beyond the scope of
our analysis, and thus represent potential directions for future research.   First, we have
focused only on efficiency issues, and have ignored equity issues.  Protected groups are
often economically disadvantaged, which could also provide an equity argument for
additional protection–though this argument depends on the identity of the victim,
whereas hate crime laws are typically based on the motivation for the crime, not the
victim’s identity.
Second, we have considered the normative issue of optimal hate crime policy, but
not the positive political economy issue of why hate crime policy has developed in the
way that it has, though the issues are clearly linked.  It would be interesting to research
the factors that explain states’ decisions to enact hate crimes laws.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, further empirical research on the effects of
hate crime would be very valuable.  The psychology and sociology literatures include19
substantial research on the harm to those who are direct victims of hate crime relative to
the harm to victims of other crimes, though this literature is far from conclusive (see
McDevitt et al., 2002).  And for the other effects modeled in this paper, there exists only
anecdotal evidence–though hate-crime experts seem to agree that these effects exist and
are important (particularly that hate crime inflicts damage on a broader community than
just the direct victim).  Empirically measuring these effects would be difficult, but very
valuable.20
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Appendix: Proofs of Results 4 and 5
Proof of Result 4:
Let the marginal cost of avoidance effort be  ε +
V C1 .  First, we rewrite Condition (2) to
find the new level of individual effort:








Thus, the partial derivative of a(g, ε) with respect to ε is given by
1
11 11 2 ] [ ) , (
− − Δ =
V
N
N C U P g a V
C ε ,
where the arguments are suppressed for clarity.  Note that a2(g, ε) is strictly negative.
Similarly, we rewrite Condition (5a) to get the first-order condition for the optimal
government effort level g*(ε):
. 0 ) ( } 1 ]{ [ 1 1 1 1 1 2 = − + − + − Δ +
G V V C C C a N P U P a P N ε (A2)
Note that a1(g, ε) is still given by Expression (3), and that it does not vary with a, g, or ε.
The effect of a marginal increase in ε on the left-hand side of Condition A2 is given by
[ ] [ ] 1 ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) }( 1 { 2 11 1 2 1 1 1 2 11 1 12 + − + + + + − Δ ε ε g a C a N g a P P a P P a P P U N
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−  (A3)
If P12 > 0, then a1 > 0, and each of the three terms in the square brackets in Expression
(A3) is greater than zero.  Since a2(g, ε) is strictly negative, then, the value of Expression
(A3) is negative, so an increase in ε lowers the value of Condition (A2) below zero.  ToA-2
restore equality, g must fall.
If P12 = 0, then Expression (A3) reduces to
[ ] ), , ( 2 2 1 ε g a P P N
C (A3a)
which is still strictly negative.  Since the square-bracketed term in Expression (A3) is
increasing without bound in P12, for low enough values of P12 Expression (A3) is positive.
In that case, an increase in ε implies that g must rise.
Thus, if government punishment effort and victims’ avoidance effort are strong enough
substitutes in raising the expected cost of committing a crime, then an increase in the
marginal cost of victims’ effort leads to a increase in the optimal level of government
effort.  Otherwise, it leads to a decrease. ■
Proof of Result 5:
Let a1N(g, N
V) denote the partial derivative of a1(g, N
V) with respect to N
V.  Implicit
differentiation of Condition (3) yields
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Note that the sign of a1N(g, N
V) is the opposite of the sign of P12.  Note also that
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which has the same sign as P12.
The marginal effect of an increase in N
V on the left-hand side of Condition (5a) is
given byA-3
1 1 1 1 1 ] ) 1 ( [ a C C N P U P N a
V V V C
N − − + − Δ
) ]( [ )] 1 ( [ 1 1 1 1 1 a a N C P U P N a N
V V C
N + − + − Δ = . (A4)
In Expression (A4), both of the terms in square brackets are positive.  If P12 > 0, then
a1N<0 and N
Va1N + a1N > 0, so the value of Expression (A4) is negative.  Thus, an increase
in N
V lowers the left-hand side of Condition (5a) below zero, and government effort g
must fall to restore equality.  Analogously, if P12 < 0, then an increase in increase in N
V
implies a rise in g. ■